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Abstract 
Norway and Sweden have agreed on a joint green certificate market applicable from 
January 1st 2012. This has caused debate. Scientists, politicians, environmentalists and 
others have expressed their concerns and issues related to the market regulation, where 
arguments have been inconsistent and conflicting. This study aims to make it clearer 
what these presented arguments, issues and concerns are, what they are based on and 
whether they can be supported by economic theory. The study has analyzed six topics, 
and conclusions have been drawn for every topic. Producer and end-user prices will 
decrease. Security of supply will increase, which will have a positive effect on the net 
energy balance. Volatility in the certificate prices will be reduced with the opportunity 
of certificate banking. The certificate measure will have marginal impact on CO2-
emissions. The measure will be cost-efficient and cause increased predictability of 
investment subsidies for RES seeking investors. 
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1  Outline and scope of the thesis 
1.1  Introduction 
After years of negotiations, Norway and Sweden agreed on a joint green certificate 
market applicable from January 1st 2012. A market for green certificates is by many 
seen as the best suitable measure for increasing RES investments and to stimulate 
renewable energy production. The green certificate market debate has been flourishing 
in the media for as long as the thoughts about Norway implementing a green certificate 
market have existed. With interest and curiosity the author has followed this debate, as 
the certificate market measure has been honoured in one moment and strongly criticized 
in the other. Scientists and economists, socialists and environmentalists, politicians and 
traders have expressed their different views and opinions. The trend seems to be that 
politicians and NGOs are excited about the market regulation while economists and 
scientists have a more negative point of view. Nevertheless, statements and concerns 
are countless and conflicting, making it difficult and confusing for the common 
Norwegian electricity consumer to understand what the consequences of a green 
certificate market actually are. Some publications claim consumer prices of electricity 
would increase with a certificate market, while others state the market regulation would 
lead to the exact opposite. Various published articles emphasize how cost-inefficient 
subsidising renewable energy is and how off-guard the politicians are to engage in such 
a market regulation, while other research papers state the certificate market is a cost-
efficient measure. Several NGOs have expressed their satisfaction with the green house 
gas emission reduction a certificate market would lead to, while economists on the 
other hand claim the green market would have zero or negative effect on emissions.  
I hope this study will contribute to clarify the arguments, issues and concerns that have 
been presented in the certificate market debate. A special thank is given to my thesis 
advisor, Professor Lars Mathiesen for useful inputs, guidance and feedback along the 
way, and to all the people that have helped me reach the final result.  
 
1.2  Purpose and structure 
The purpose of this study is to identify and examine, what the author has found to be, 
the most important and relevant pro and con arguments, issues and concerns presented 
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in the green certificate market debate. This includes topics like producer1 and end-user 
prices, security of supply and the energy balance, volatility in certificate prices, impacts 
on CO2-emissions, cost-efficiency, research and development, and the certificate 
market’s impact on the predictability of investment subsidies.  
The paper will start with a presentation of the characteristics of the Norwegian energy 
market. Green house gases and the RES-E Directive will be emphasized, as well as the 
potential for some of the new renewable energy sources in Norway. A presentation of 
the green certificate market will follow. It will be explained what green certificates are, 
how the market works and how certificate prices are determined. Some experiences 
from the Swedish green certificate market will be given attention to at the end of the 
section. The latter part of the thesis will discuss the above-mentioned topics. Analysis 
will be conducted in order to see what the presented arguments of politicians, 
economists, environmentalists and others are based on and whether they can be 
supported by economic theory. The result of the analysis will be presented in a 
conclusion for every topic at the end of the study. 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
The focus of this study is to clear up the green certificate market debate. The aim is to 
make it comprehensible for the reader to see the impacts of the market regulation when 
it comes to producer and end-user prices, security of supply and the energy balance, 
volatility in certificate prices, impacts on CO2-emissions, cost-efficiency, R&D and 
predictability of investment subsidies. The study does not engage in comparing the 
certificate market measure with other tools that could be suitable for promoting 
renewable energy and thus reaching the RES-E target.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Producer prices refer to spot prices, i.e. the price traditional electricity producers receive for their 
production and the price green producers receive without the additional certificate subsidy. 
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2 Background 
Global warming and energy crisis are some of the biggest challenges the world is 
currently experiencing. A global increase in temperature and the resulting consequences 
for future generations, carbon emissions, future energy supply and power prices are 
topics that get increased attention in the media. The global temperature is rising with 
increasing amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. Simultaneously, the world is currently 90 
percent driven by fossil fuels. The challenge is to make the world less dependent on 
fossil fuels, which both are finite resources and have negative environmental impact. 
Politicians and scientists have tried to reach a global agreement for reducing green 
house gases, however global treaties seem to be hard to achieve. The European Union 
has been seen as a pioneer in this area by capping emissions and implement ambitious 
targets for promoting electricity from new renewable energy sources. In 2009 the 
European Union introduced “Directive 2009/28/EC” also known as the RES-E 
Directive. The Directive requires that 20 percent of the total energy consumption within 
the EU must come from renewable sources by 2020. The Directive is part of the 
European Union’s 20-20-20-target, which includes  
• 20% reduction in GHG compared to 1990-level by 2020 
• 20% increased energy efficiency by 2020 
• 20% of the total energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020 
 
The RES-E Directive has been implemented in the EEA agreement, which Norway is a 
part of. That means that 67,5 percent of the Norwegian energy has to come from 
renewable sources within 2020, an increase of 9,5 percent from the current share of 58 
percent. In 2008 the Norwegian political parties agreed on “Klimaforliket”, a 
Norwegian climate policy settlement. The settlement states that Norway aims to reduce 
its green house gas emissions by 30 percent by 2020 and be carbon neutral within 2030. 
Furthermore, the settlement claimed that Norway should engage in further negotiations 
with Sweden regarding a joint green certificate market. After years of negotiations the 
joint market became reality in June 2011, when Sweden and Norway agreed on having 
the same goal for the market outcome. The ambition is a combined target of electricity 
production from new renewable sources of 26,4 TWh by 2020, divided by 13,2 TWh 
for each country. The aim of the green certificate measure is to increase the security of 
energy supply through increasing renewable energy investments, promote 
environmental and climate targets and to facilitate more stable electricity prices. With 
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increased electricity production in Norway and Sweden, the countries would be less 
dependent on imported energy. Population growth both nationally and globally 
increases the demand for energy. Renewable energy sources could contribute to 
increase the electricity production, but these sources have proven to be relative much 
more expensive relative to hydropower and fossil fuels and thus cannot penetrate the 
market without subsidies. By introducing a green certificate market, new renewable 
energy sources would receive an additional income in terms of certificate revenue and 
thus more of these sources could be developed. A market for green certificates is 
therefore one example of a policy measure that could help Norway reach the RES-E 
target within 2020.  
	  	   12	  
3  The Energy Market 
A market for green certificates is dependent on the conditions and trends in the market 
for electricity. It is thus necessary to have some knowledge about the energy market in 
order to understand how a market for green certificates works and to perceive what the 
arguments, issues and concerns related to the regulation of a certificate market are 
based on.  
3.1  Characteristics of the Norwegian Energy Market 
The Norwegian energy market has some certain characteristics that make it different 
from energy markets in most other countries. First of all, Norway is rich on natural 
resources. Relatively cheap access to electricity from hydropower has made Norway 
rely on this source of energy for centuries. In a normal year2 99 percent of the 
Norwegian electricity originates from hydropower plants, while electricity production 
from wind and heat is marginal. The diagram in figure 1 illustrates hydropower’s 
dominating position in the Norwegian electricity production from year 1960 to 2008, 
and how the production from heat and wind is lacking behind.  
Figure 1: Yearly electricity production (TWh) in Norway from 1960 to 2008.  
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), 2010.  
Norway is the largest hydropower producer in the European Union and the sixth largest 
hydropower producer in the world (NVE, 2011). The development of hydropower 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A year with normal rainfall and temperatures is referred to as a normal year  
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plants in Norway has been growing rapidly during the last century and currently two 
thirds of the hydropower potential in Norway is already installed (NVE, 2011). 
The abundant supply of hydropower has made Norway the largest consumer of 
electricity per capita in the world, as almost 50 percent of the total energy consumption 
in Norway (112 TWh of a total of 244 TWh in 2010) consists of electricity. In 2008 
Norway consumed 27300 KWh of electricity per capita while the European average 
was 5700 KWh (Statistics Norway, 2011). This is partly due to the fact that electricity 
has been relatively cheaper in Norway compared to other European countries, thus 
electricity to a greater extent also is used for household heating. Most other countries 
rely on oil-based heating systems and are dependent on fossil fuels for their electricity 
production (Bye and Hoel, 2009). Prices on oil, coal and gas are relatively more 
expensive than hydropower, which naturally influences consumption.  
Even though electricity from hydropower dominates the Norwegian energy 
consumption, petroleum products are other central resources, as can be seen in figure 
23.  
Figure 2: Total end-consumption of energy (%) by energy commodity, 2010  
 
Source: Statistics Norway, 2011 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A model (in Norwegian) of how the Norwegian energy system is functioning can be found in appendix 
A.  
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Petroleum products equal 35,7 percent of the total energy consumption in Norway in 
2010. If we include coal, coke and gas, 43 percent of the energy consumption in 2010 
came from carbon emitting sources. 
The Norwegian electricity market has been liberalized since 1991. There are 
approximately 200 power-producing companies in Norway where 10 of these constitute 
almost 70 percent of all the production capacity (OED, 2008). At the Nordic 
multinational energy exchange, Nord Pool Spot, the balance between supply and 
demand determines the power prices in each pricing area within the Nordic area. 350 
electricity companies from 18 countries operate on the exchange and in 2010 74 percent 
of all power in the Nordic region was traded at Nord Pool Spot. Figure 3 demonstrates 
how the intersection between purchases bids and sales bids determines the price of 
electricity for every hour of the day. This price is also referred to as the system price.  
Figure 3: Determination of the system price at Nord Pool Spot 
 
Source: www.nordpoolspot.com 
The hourly system price for each pricing area is determined by the intersection of the 
aggregate supply and demand curves, which are representing all bids and offers of 
electricity for the entire Nordic region. Norway is divided into five different power 
price areas, where the prices depend on supply and demand of electricity in each area. 
Shortage of electricity production, grid constraints and bottlenecks cause higher system 
prices in some areas than others. When transmission capacity gets constrained, the price 
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is raised to create an incentive for the electricity suppliers in this area to increase their 
production and for consumers to decrease their demand in the areas affected (Nord Pool 
Spot). North- and Mid-Norway are areas where the electricity prices on average are 
higher compared to the rest of the country. Temperature, economic development and 
growth, prices on fossil fuels, rainfall, production capacities and prices on emission 
quotas are all factors influencing the system prices at Nord Pool Spot (Øydgard and 
Hansson 2010).  
Norway has been switching between being a net exporter and a net importer of energy 
the last years. In 2010 the primary energy production decreased compared to the 
previous year (Statistics Norway, 2011). The production of oil decreased, so did the 
production of hydropower due to less water in the reservoirs. In 2010 the total energy 
production in Norway was 124,5 TWh, which was 6 percent lower than the year before. 
A decrease in energy production simultaneously as the demand for electricity increased 
caused a demand for imported energy. In 2010 Norway imported 7,5 TWh electricity 
and had a negative net energy balance, while in 2009 Norway had a positive net energy 
balance with an export quota of approximately 9 TWh electricity (Statistics Norway, 
2011). Import and export of electricity is possible due to grid connections with other 
countries. Norway’s electricity grid is currently directly connected to Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Russia and Holland (Statnett, 2008). 
A reliable energy supply is an important target in the Norwegian energy policy. Norway 
wants to avoid being dependent on imported energy in the long term and aims to be 
self-supplied with energy from renewable sources in a normal year (NOU 1998:11).  
3.2  Greenhouse gas emissions and the RES-E Directive  
In 2010 Norwegian emissions of green house gases increased compared to previous 
years. The total amount of emissions was 53,7 million CO2-equivalents, which is 4,8 
percent more than in 2009. Increased metal production and an increase in transportation 
are to blame for the emission increase (Statistics Norway, 2011). Thus, it might seem 
that Norway’s efforts of implementing a carbon tax on oil heating and transportation 
have not had the desired effect on the national CO2-emissions. Norway aims to reduce 
its green house gas emissions by 30 percent within 2020 compared to 1990-level. Two 
thirds of the emission cuts will be done nationally, the other third through clean 
development mechanisms, which involve investing in emission-reducing projects such 
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as renewable energy, energy efficiency or fuel switching in developing countries where 
abatement can be done cheaper. Norway has furthermore agreed to reduce the 
emissions by 40 percent relative to 1990-level if this could lead to agreements on 
ambitious climate treaties where large carbon emitting countries like the United States 
and China are willing to commit to specific emission obligations (Klimakur, 2009).   
 
Norway is a part of the EEA and is thus obliged to implement the European Union’s 
Directive on Electricity Production from Renewable Energy Sources, also known as the 
RES-E Directive, which was introduced in the European Union in 2009. The aim of the 
directive is to increase the European Union’s share of energy from renewable sources 
from 8,5 percent in 2005 to 20 percent in 2020 measured in relation to the member 
countries’ total energy consumption. The RES-E Directive is one part of the European 
Union’s 20-20-20 target4 as an attempt to combat climate change and global warming.  
In order to reach the ambition of 20 percent renewable energy production each 
European Union member state has its own national renewable target, which in total will 
constitute the overall goal of 20 percent increase in energy from renewable sources 
within the European Union. Among the European Union member countries Sweden has 
the highest aim of 49,5 percent energy from renewable energy sources by 20205. 
Norway’s target is even more ambitious; 67,5 percent energy form renewable sources 
within 2020 (Blakstad, 2011). 
In 2005 Norway had a share of energy from renewable sources of 58 percent. By 2020, 
an increase of 9,5 percent needs to be realized in order for Norway to reach the target of 
67,5 percent energy from renewable sources. This demands a steeper growth in the 
development of renewable energy sources that add to the already existing sources in the 
Norwegian energy system.  
3.3  Renewable energy sources  
Renewable energy is energy from sources that do not run out and that do not have 
environmental impact on the world’s climate in terms of carbon emissions. Hydro, 
wind, solar, wave, tide, osmosis, geothermal and biomass are some examples of 
renewable energy sources. In context of increasing RES investments, Norway has an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 EU’s 20-20-20 target: 20% reduction in green house gases, 20% increase in renewable energy 
production, 20% reduction in energy consumption through energy efficiency.  
5 Refer to appendix B for a complete overview of each EU countries’ RES-E targets.	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advantageous position. With a long coastline and a topography characterized by high 
mountains, rivers and lakes the conditions are well suitable for energy production from 
wind and hydro. Even though hydropower is a well-established technology in Norway, 
new renewable sources need to be implemented in order for Norway to comply with the 
RES-E Directive, to ensure security of supply and to make an attempt to reduce 
emissions of green house gases from fossil fuels. In the next section of the thesis, the 
potential of wind energy and small-scale hydropower will be presented. These two 
technologies are assumed to be the dominating new renewable sources arising from the 
regulation of a green certificate market in Norway. The conditions for solar power are 
poor in Norway, technologies for oceanic energy sources are still too undeveloped and 
premature and use of biomass in Norway has been low due to protection of biodiversity 
and air pollution (Haugneland, 2007).  
3.3.1 Wind power  
With its long, windy coastline Norway has an advantageous position for generating 
energy from both onshore and offshore windmills. The total physical potential for wind 
energy in Norway is calculated to be several thousand terawatt hours per year. A wind 
map of Norway is presented in figure 4, specifying the conditions and wind speeds 
along the Norwegian cost in meters per second.  
Figure 4: Wind map of Norway. Wind speeds in 80 meters heights (m/s) 
 
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE)   
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The map proofs a great wind power potential for Norway with wind speeds up to 11 
meters per second. However, large parts of this potential are not reachable due to 
environmental and economic factors (fornybar.no, 2011). In 2001 the Norwegian 
government announced a target of developing wind power plants that annual produce 3 
TWh by 2010. Despite the ambitions ten years ago, Norway has still a modest 
electricity production originating from wind. In 2009 only 0,8 percent of the total 
energy production in Norway consisted of wind power (NVE, 2009). By the end of 
2010 Norway has an installed wind capacity of 441 MW divided by 18 wind parks and 
200 turbines (NVE, 2011). A comparison with other European countries states the fact 
that Norway is lacking behind. With 27214 MW installed capacity by the end of 2010 
Germany is the European wind power champion. Also Sweden has a higher share than 
Norway; 2163 MW installed capacity by the end of the same year6.  
3.3.2  Small-scale hydropower 
Even though two thirds of Norway’s hydropower potential already is developed, it is 
estimated that there is a remaining potential of 37,5 TWh per year. 25 TWh of this 
remaining potential comes from small-scale hydropower plants with yearly capacity 
below 10 MW (NVE, 2009). The potential is calculated from an upper investment limit 
of renewable production of NOK 3kr/KWh (NVE, 2009), which makes some of the 
predicted potential unprofitable without subsidies. The current power prices are too low 
to make these projects competitive on their own. 
3.3.3 Theoretical vs. real potential 
Even though the potential for wind and small-scale hydropower in Norway seems to be 
large, it is important to point out the difference between theoretical and real potential. 
The following sections present the environmental and the economic factors influencing 
the real potential of wind and small-scale hydropower in Norway.  
3.3.3.1 Environmental factors 
The NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) phenomenon has in some cases proven to be an 
obstacle for wind farm development in specific areas. “Everyone” wants sustainable, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The European overview of total installed wind power capacity divided by country can be found in 
appendix C. 
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environmental friendly energy, but “nobody” wants to have the renewable power plants 
close to their neighbourhood where these plants might be noisy and disturb the natural 
landscape and the view. Additionally, due to the protected grounds and waterfalls some 
of the potential for further hydropower cannot be developed. 45,7 TWh of the total 
hydropower potential of 205,7 TWh (per year 2008) are located in protected areas and 
is hence not suitable for production (fornybar.no). Rarity and outdoor activities are 
factors influencing the decisions of the Norwegian Ministry of Environment whether 
certain areas should be protected or not, as development of hydropower plant often 
demands severe impacts in the nature and the landscape (NOU, 1998:11). In 2008 the 
remaining potential of hydropower that is not protected from being developed was 37,5 
TWh per year.  
3.3.3.2 Economic factors 
At present stage energy production from renewable sources like wind cannot compete 
economical with the traditional and relatively cheap Norwegian hydropower. While 
there are no fuel costs associated with generating wind power, the investment costs of 
building a wind power project are large. The wind power industry is capital intensive. 
As much as 75 to 80 percent of the total cost is related to upfront capital costs, while the 
operation and maintenance cost attribute to the remaining 20 to 25 percent 
(vindkraft.no). Wind farms demand large material constructions and geographical areas, 
which makes the cost of this energy source significantly more expensive than hydro.   
Producers of small-scale hydro are dependent on financial support for covering 
investment costs related to development of small-scale hydropower projects. A great 
share of these sources is located on private grounds or places where there are 
difficulties in connecting the production to the grid. In addition, small-scale 
hydropower projects often rely on sources that have either moderate water flow or are 
frozen during wintertime. Such production disruptions cause further competitive 
challenges for small-scale hydropower sources.  
The experiences from Norway illustrate that if renewable energy sources like wind are 
required to compete under pure market conditions, the development of new renewable 
capacity will slow down or come to halt if policies are not introduced (Morthorst, 
2000). Public subsidies to R&D, as well as demonstrations of energy technology, are 
provided through channels like the Research Council of Norway, Innovation Norway, 
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Enova SF and other governmental organs. Enova SF, an underlying organ of the Royal 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy relies on financial instruments and 
incentives to stimulate Norwegian wind power investments. Subsidies of renewable 
energy are a heavy burden on the public budget. In 2010 Enova SF provided 
approximately NOK 1 billion in subsidies to four onshore wind farm projects in 
Norway, and has since 2001 granted NOK 2,6 billion in subsidies of renewable energy 
projects (Enova, 2011). In Europe, more than 100 million Euros were taken from the 
public budget in 1998 only to subsidize wind turbines (Morthorst, 2000). The current 
system where governmental payments decide how much is being invested in renewable 
energy is vulnerable as it relies strongly on political will. In this context, the Norwegian 
government has suggested that a market for green certificates will be an appropriate 
tool to increase renewable energy production in Norway according to the RES-E 
Directive without the public budget bearing the costs.  
Even though Norway is required by the European Union to obey the RES-E Directive, 
it is not a requirement to use the green certificate market as the measure for reaching the 
2020-target. Every European country that is committed by the RES-E Directive has the 
right to choose the tool they think is the most appropriate for their own country. After 
years of negotiations, the Norwegian government concluded that a binding joint green 
certificate market with Sweden would be the best suitable measure for increasing 
energy production from renewable sources.  
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4  The Green Certificate Market 
In the following part of the paper there will be given an introduction to the green 
certificate market. The price determination of the green certificate will be explained in 
addition to what influences the certificate price. Lastly, a short overview of and 
experiences from the Swedish green certificate market will be presented.   
4.1  The aim of a green certificate market 
The aim of a green certificate market is to ensure further RES investments. The target 
of the Swedish/Norwegian green certificate market is a development of new renewable 
energy technologies that in total produce 26,4 TWh of new renewable energy in 
Norway and Sweden combined by 2020 (OED, 2011). Increased development of new 
renewable energy sources will lead to improved security of energy supply, more stable 
energy prices and help reaching climate policy targets (Riis-Johansen, 2011).  
A market for green certificate would release the government from its rather heavy 
burden of subsiding renewable technologies (Morthhorst, 2000). After the introduction 
of a green certificate market, the additional costs of developing renewable energy will 
be transferred from governmental institutions to the consumers. Through their 
participation in the certificate market, electricity consumers will be subsidising the 
development of new renewable energy sources in both Norway and Sweden. 
4.2  The functioning of a green certificate market 
A market for green certificates is a subsidy scheme for promoting renewable energy 
production from wind energy, bio energy, wave energy, small-scale hydropower and 
solar energy. These sources are also referred to as new renewable energy sources7. As 
seen in the previous section, small-scale hydro and wind power are identified as the 
most promising of these technologies in Norway. There will be a purchaser 
commitment for the end-users to consume a certain share of new renewable energy of 
their total electricity consumption. However people living in the regions Finnmark and 
North-Troms will be exempted. By purchasing the compulsory green certificates, which 
is a guarantee that the energy originates from a new renewable source, consumers are 
ensured new renewable energy consumption. The electric utility companies are buying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In this paper the term ”new renewable energy” would be used analogue to “green energy”.  
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the required amount of certificates on behalf of their customers and add the cost to the 
consumer’s electricity bills. The consumers are thus not directly involved in the 
certificate trading and the scheme requires no knowledge of certificate trading from the 
average end-user. Figure 5 is a theoretical visualization of how a green certificate 
market will be harmonized with the traditional power market. As we can see from the 
figure, the electricity market and the green certificate market will work as two 
individual markets.  
Figure 5: How the certificate market will be harmonized with the power market 
Source: www.ae.no 
The energy authorities in Norway and Sweden will determine a specific renewable 
energy quota for every year up to 2035. This is a percentage share of the total energy 
consumption that should come from renewable sources. A complete table of the annual 
quotas and the corresponding forecasted new renewable production in Norway for the 
years 2012 - 2035 can be found in table 1. Certificates are being issued based on the 
level of the quota, and producers of new renewable energy receive certificates 
according to each megawatt hour of approved green electricity they produce. A penalty 
will be given to those consumers who do not comply with the mandatory amount of 
certificates, however energy intensive industries are exempted from participating. This 
is to ensure that these industries are not restrained by an excessively large additional 
certificate cost that makes them unable to maintain their international competitiveness 
in their respective markets. 
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Table 1: Norwegian annual quotas from 2003-2035 and prognoses of new 
renewable energy production 
 
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) 
 
Green electricity producers receive an income from the certificates they sell in addition 
to the system price they get from their electricity production. That means that with a 
green certificate market, producers of renewable energy will gain a higher income than 
prior to the market regulation. This higher return can be used to cover the relatively 
higher costs. New renewable sources that earlier could not be developed and thus not 
enter the market due to high development costs and in-competiveness, are now able to 
sell their green energy in the market, as the additional certificate price covers more of 
their development costs. The average electricity price in Norway in 2009 was NOK 
36,3 øre/KWh, hence the development cost of renewable projects could not exceed 36,3 
øre/KWh in order to be put into operation. In Sweden in the same period the price of a 
green certificate was NOK 24,2 øre/KWh. Given these prices, calculations show that 
production from renewable energy sources with development costs of up to NOK 60,5 
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øre/KWh could penetrate the electricity market after the implementation of the green 
certificate market (fornybar.no).  
The green certificate market will be technologically neutral. Neutrality of technology 
means that the most profitable energy projects will be developed first, regardless of 
source. All varieties of new renewable energy sources can be included in the scheme 
except from the well-established, large-scaled hydropower plants. Since this is an 
already competitive and profitable technology, it is not dependent on the extra subsidy 
income from the certificates. However, newly developed hydropower plants with a 
maximum production capacity of 10 MW that need the extra income in order to be able 
to enter the energy market, will be included in the scheme. The green certificates are to 
be sold at the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool Spot. The decisions from the energy 
authorities regarding the renewable quotas for each year determine how many 
certificates that will be demanded. 
The development of a separate green certificate market is one of several models 
generating additional payments to renewable technologies. This model will facilitate the 
integration of renewable into the liberalized market and at the same time make it 
possible for these technologies to be partly economic compensated for the 
environmental benefits they generate compared to conventional power production. The 
Netherlands has had a voluntary green certificate market since the beginning of 1998 
(The Green Label), England and Wales since 2002 (UK Renewables Obligation 
Certificate Market), Italy, Austria and Belgium have also implemented certificate 
markets, while Sweden has had a binding green certificate market since 2003.  
4.3  Price determination of green certificates 
The price of the green certificates is determined by the intersection of supply of new 
renewable energy sources that have the right to be assigned certificates, and the 
required demand of certificates in the separate green certificate market. The supply 
curve represents the available new renewable energy sources given by increasing 
development costs of the source. A ranking of electrical sources in order of their short-
run marginal costs of production is in theory referred to as a merit order. The supply 
curve in the green certificate market is thus a merit order curve. The required demand 
for the green certificates is dependent on the level of the renewable energy quota (in 
TWh) issued by the energy authorities for each specific year. The quota is given by the 
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symbol alpha (α) and imposes the consumers how much of their electricity 
consumption that needs to come from new renewable sources. The level of the quota 
will be at its highest in 2020, when 18,3 percent of the consumers’ total electricity 
consumption has to come from green sources. The demand curve for green certificates 
represents the required annual quota and is thus inelastic8 on an annual basis, illustrated 
by a vertical demand curve in the certificate market in figure 6.  
Figure 6: Price determination in a green certificate market and the implications 
for the electricity market in the long run where demand is assumed to be elastic 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
The system price for electrical power, P0 is determined as normal in Nord Pool Spot’s 
hourly spot market. The intersection between bids and sales determines the price of 
electricity for each hour of each day, as can be seen in the right part of figure 6. 
Purchase bids are analogue to demand while sales bids equal supply. Figure 6 is a long-
term market diagram, thus the demand for electricity is assumed to be elastic. The two 
parallel lines on the X-scale in the electricity market illustrate that this market is 
relatively much larger than the market for green certificates, i.e. the quantity generated 
is of a much larger scale. A system price equal to P0 will generate an output of Q0 TWh 
of total electricity consumption and a level of X0 TWh of new renewable energy in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Due to the relation to electricity consumption a small price elasticity might exist (Morthorst, 2000). 
Figure 6 is drawn with totally inelastic demand.	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market. This level of green energy, X0 is currently too low according to the RES-E 
Directive, and has to increase by 9,5 percent within 2020.  
By regulating the green certificate market, the government requires that a certain annual 
level of electricity must come from new renewable sources. This quota is equal to XT 
TWh, where XT = αX0 indicates that the amount of green electricity in the market 
should be equal to a percentage (α) of the total domestic electricity consumption. 
Electric utilities on behalf of their consumers are obliged to ensure that renewable 
energy consumption reaches this specific level. By requiring a share of new renewable 
energy equal to XT and simultaneously impose consumers to buy certificates, will cause 
the consumer price of electricity to increase from P0 to PT. The difference between the 
total price, PT and the initial electricity price, P0 gives us the price of one green 
certificate, PGC. Since producers of energy from new renewable sources now receive a 
higher price PT, which is the sum of P0 + PGC, new renewable energy sources that earlier 
used to be too expensive and thus unprofitable to penetrate the market now can be 
developed. Due to technological neutrality and increasing development costs, the most 
profitable sources will be developed first and more expensive sources will follow as the 
quota increases. Traditional electricity producers and energy intensive industries still 
receive and pay the initial system price P0, and traditional electricity producers will thus 
not see an increased producer surplus due to the new market implementation, as would 
be the case for the green producers.  
The certificates can be seen as subsidies to producers of new renewable energy, while 
for the consumers who are required to buy certificates the scheme is analogue to an 
electricity usage fee. This is explained in figure 6 as the consumer price in the 
electricity market increases, given by P0  + (α*Q0)*PGC = PT. Demand for electricity is 
in the long run assumed to be elastic, i.e. if possible, consumers switch to other sources 
of energy when electricity prices increases significantly. Thus, the total electricity 
consumption decreases to QT TWh in the long run. Therefore, with no other factors 
taken into account, introduction of the green certificate market will lead to higher prices 
for the consumers who in the long run may respond by demanding less electricity.  
In addition to the level of the annual green certificate quota, the system price of 
electricity determined at the energy exchange influences the price of the certificates. 
Since 99 percent of the electricity production in a normal year comes from hydropower 
and it is expected that wind power will increase its share of the total energy production, 
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weather conditions like rainfalls and wind speeds could lead to significant volatility in 
the system price and thus also the price of the certificates. Volatilities in the certificate 
price cause consequences for the green producers, as their revenue would be 
unpredictable when the certificate price varies, and for the consumers’ electricity 
expenditures.  
A box-and-whisker diagram can be used to illustrate volatilities of values over time. 
How to interpret such a diagram is shown in figure 7. The highest and lowest values are 
respectively the highest and the lowest system prices within the period. Q3 is the third 
quartile (also referred to as 75 percentile), i.e. the value of which 75 percent of the 
prices are below. Q1 is the first quartile (25 percentile), i.e. the value of which 25 
percent of the prices are below. The median value is where 50 percent of the values are 
above and 50 percent of the values are below. 
 
Figure 7: Box-and-whisker-diagram  
 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
The box-and-whisker diagram in figure 8 is based on system price data from Nord Pool 
Spot. It shows the system price on an hourly basis grouped for the months of the year in 
2010. The hourly system price throughout the year is collected to get the most accurate 
picture of the price volatility that exists in the Nordic power market.  
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Figure 8: Box-and-whisker diagram illustrating the system price volatility within a 
specific month and the month-to-month volatility in the system price for year 2010 
 
Data source: www.nordpoolspot.com 
The highest system prices in 2010 were observed in January and February, where the 
price reached 300,03 EUR/MWh. This can be explained through increased demand for 
electricity due to cold weather and lower supply due to frozen reservoirs and more 
snow than rain. The lowest observed values were in May and June with a system price 
as low as 1,8 EUR/MWh. Snow is melting during the spring causing increased supply 
and thus lower prices. From the graph we also see that the volatility within a month is 
greater during wintertime than in the summer. January was the most volatile month, 
while in April and September the prices were relatively stable. When hydropower 
producers are able to regulate their reservoir levels, the price volatility decreases. Due 
to shifting reservoir levels, inflow and temperatures, regulation becomes more difficult 
during wintertime than during spring and autumn.  
Furthermore, figure 9 illustrates the volatility on a day-to-day basis for some randomly 
selected days of the year in 2011. From the diagram we see that even during a day the 
volatility can be high, which for instance was the case for the dates 26.06.11 and 
14.09.11. Daily volatility can be explained due to peak and off-peak hours. Mornings 
during the week is normally peak hours, since numerous people get up at the same time, 
take a shower and use electric devices for breakfast cooking etc. Nights are referred to 
as off-peak hours when people are sleeping and thus use a minimum of electricity. In 
figure 9 below we see that the volatility is larger in the summer time and during the fall 
than in January – March. During the winter, the demand will be continuously high due 
throughout the day household heating.  
	  	   29	  
Figure 9: Box-and-whisker diagram illustrating both the system price volatility 
within a specific day and the time-to-time volatility in the system price for certain 
days of 2011 
 
Data source: www.nordpoolspot.com 
The certificate price increases or decreases due to changes in the system price, which 
has been proven to be volatile on both a monthly and a daily basis. Production from 
renewable energy sources is dependent on rain- and wind conditions, while at the same 
time dependent on how much is being invested in the development of these 
technologies. Financial crises play a crucial role when it comes to R&D of renewable 
technologies, i.e. the investments in clean and perhaps new technology decrease 
significantly in periods with financial instability and recessions. After the global 
financial crisis, clean tech investments dropped from $4.088 billion in 2008 to $154 
billion in 2009 (PwC, 2009). Even though this is not a topic covered by this thesis, it is 
worth mentioning that even with a market for green certificate, financial turmoil causes 
significantly declines in development, while booms in the economy on the other hand 
lead to increased development of new renewable energy sources.  
Rainfall and wind speeds will be other factors influencing the development of new 
renewable energy sources in Norway on an annual basis. A year with minor production 
from renewable sources due to weather conditions causes an increasing certificate price 
and thus higher revenue for the green producers, ensuring profitability of new projects. 
A year with major renewable energy production will on the other hand lead to the 
opposite. The following section gives an analysis of these two scenarios and how the 
certificate price is being affected.  
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4.3.1 Minor production from renewable sources 
Since approximately 99 percent of the electricity production in Norway comes from 
hydropower, a dry year will cause a decrease in the electricity production. This is 
indicated by an inward shift in the supply curve in the electricity market, which makes 
the system price increase. The demand for electricity is assumed to be inelastic within a 
year, illustrated by a vertical demand curve. Even though the domestic electricity 
production decreases, import of electricity makes it possible to maintain the same 
amount of electricity consumption even in a year with minor production from 
renewable sources. The supply of new renewable energy sources will also decrease, as 
most of the new renewable energy production in the green certificate market is expected 
to come from small-scale hydro and wind power, which are significantly dependent on 
weather conditions. Since the green electricity sources only constitute approximately 10 
percent of the total electricity production, the inward shift in supply from renewable 
energy sources in both markets will have a significantly larger impact in the smaller 
certificate market than in the larger electricity market. The new renewable production 
might therefore be too low to cover the required renewable energy consumption given 
by the annual quota, which is being held at a fixed percentage level throughout the year. 
Since the demand for the certificates will be larger than the supply of certificates, the 
price of the certificates will increase due to scarcity of supply in the amount of 
certificates in the market. The effect of a dry year with modest wind speeds is thus that 
the certificate price will increase, as can be seen in figure 109. Since the certificate price 
increases with decreasing production from new renewable sources, the government has 
decided on a maximum price for the certificates. A maximum certificate price would 
ensure that consumers are not suffering due to the consequences of an unlimited 
certificate price.   
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The supply curve in the green certificate market represents a merit order curve.  
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Figure 10: Implications for the certificate price in a year with minor renewable 
energy production under the assumption of almost inflexible demand in the short 
run.  
 
Source: Own figure 
Some consumers might not be able to buy the required amount of certificates they are 
obliged due to the scarcity of supply, and thus have to pay the penalty price for not 
covering their renewable share. In Sweden the penalty fee is 150 percent of the average 
green certificate price from the previous 12 months (Rydén et al., 2006). A higher total 
electricity price for the consumers due to higher certificate- and system price leads to a 
decrease in the total demand for energy in the long run. When the total energy 
consumption decreases, the share of renewable energy consumption also decreases. 
This is affecting the green producers, as the demand for their production will decrease 
in the long run.  
4.3.2  Major production from renewable sources 
A reverse scenario will lead to the opposite. A windy year with heavy rainfalls will 
cause the production of renewable energy sources to increase from S to S’, illustrated 
by an outward shift in the supply curve in both the electricity market and the green 
certificate market. Since increased production from new renewable sources causes an 
outward shift in the supply, additional new renewable energy sources can be developed 
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and thus more certificates will be issued. Since there are more certificates on the 
market, the price of the certificates will decrease, leaving the green producers with 
lower additional income per certificate. This can be seen from figure 1110 as the 
certificate price decreases to a level equal to the difference P’T – P’, which is a lower 
income per certificate for the green producers than in the above scenario.  
Figure 11: Implications for the certificate price in a year with major renewable 
energy production under the assumption of almost inflexible demand in the short 
run.  
 
Source: Own figure 
When the price of the certificates decreases, green producers could have problems 
covering their costs. If the decreased return per certificate cannot be counterbalanced by 
increased green production, which would mean additional certificates and thus 
additional certificate income, green producers would lose profit. In that case, “a 
minimum price” of the certificates decided by the energy authorities could be life 
saving for many of these premature technologies and ensure new renewable sources 
still are being developed despite decreasing certificate price.  
As the above analysis have illustrated, a wet and windy year causes the amount of 
certificates to increase and thus the certificate price to decrease, while a dry and non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The supply curve in the green certificate market represents a merit order curve.  
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windy year on the other hand leads to an increase in the certificate prices. However, 
major production from renewable sources due to wet and windy years causes lower spot 
prices and thus consumers might demand more electricity in the long run. As a certain 
share of the consumers’ electricity consumption has to come from new renewable 
sources, the demand for green energy might thus also increase.  
The above scenarios have shown that wind and water conditions are among many of the 
factors influencing the system price, which in turn influence the price of the green 
certificates. In order to avoid serious fluctuations in the price of the green certificates it 
is important that the government finds the best suitable quota for their desired share of 
green energy in the market. Wind and water conditions are difficult to forecast ahead of 
time when the required quota for each year is to be decided. It is impossible for 
consumers to use a specific share of renewable energy if the weather conditions do not 
allow sufficient production. Nevertheless, in order to avoid severe volatility in the 
certificate prices that will have consequences for both the renewable energy producers 
and for the consumers’ variable energy expenditures, it is important to set the 
renewable energy quota as accurate as possible for every year. Experiences from the 
Swedish green certificate market have shown that a quota that is not correlated to the 
volatility in the system price has its consequences, as the revenue for the green 
producers are dependent on their income from the certificate price. However, both 
maximum prices (the penalty price) and minimum prices could get rid of some of the 
most severe consequences for both producers and consumers. Another measure to 
ensure increased price stability is to issue certificates without a due date. This would 
give consumers the ability to buy and store certificates when the price is low and use 
them for years where the demand for and the price of the certificates are higher. Some 
of the variability in the certificate price could thus be evened out, which will be more 
detailed discussed in a later part of the paper.  
4.4   The Swedish green certificate market 
Sweden has had a green certificate market since 2003. In the context of Norway joining 
this market, it is interesting to see how well the market has been functioning in terms of 
increases in new renewable energy production.  
As a member of the European Union, Sweden has a target of 49,5 percent energy from 
renewable sources within 2020 and aims for a share of at least 50 percent after that. The 
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Swedish government states that the green certificate market is the most important tool 
for increasing electricity production from renewable energy sources, with an ambition 
of 25 TWh increase in electricity from new renewable sources by 2020 compared to 
2002-level (Prop.2008/09:163).  
For each megawatt hour of new renewable energy produced, Swedish green producers 
receive one certificate. Energy sources with the right of being assigned green 
certificates in Sweden are wind, wave, solar, geothermal, peat, biomass and 
hydropower (Swedish National Grid, 2011). Small-scale hydropower plant with a 
maximum installed capacity of 1,5 MW by the end of 2003, in addition to newly 
installed or restored hydropower plants or plants that are not qualified for long-term 
profitable production, are included in the scheme (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). 
With respect to existing hydropower, Swedish and Norwegian authorities differ in their 
view on what should constitute small-scale hydropower. Norway is more inclined to 
accept a more generous capacity limit (10 MW) than Sweden (1,5 MW). Producers of 
energy from the above mentioned renewable sources in Sweden are assigned 
certificates for a period of 15 years. Energy intensive industry is exempted from 
participating in the required green certificates market, just like would be the case for the 
similar industry in Norway.  
Swedish energy authorities have calculated the green certificate quotas up to year 2035. 
The quota for every year (in percent of total electricity production) can be found in 
table 2, as well as the forecasts for how much new renewable energy they are expecting 
to be generated given each year’s quota. The last column in the table shows the real 
outcome of new renewable electricity production. By the end of 2009 an accumulated 
increased production of 9,06 TWh electricity from new renewable sources had been 
generated in Sweden from 2003. From the same calculations, Sweden will reach the 
target of 25 TWh accumulated electricity from new renewable sources in 2020 by a 
quota that year of 19,5 percent. The years following from 2020, the quotas in the 
Swedish green certificate market will decrease until year 2035 when the market will 
cease to exist.  
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Table 2: The Swedish quotas from 2003-2035, prognoses of new renewable energy 
production and the real outcome of new renewable energy production. 
Source: Swedish Energy Agency, 2009.   
The forecasted amount of accumulated new renewable electricity production in Sweden 
by the end of 2011 was 11,84 TWh. In order for Sweden to reach their target of 25 
TWh increase in electricity from new renewable sources within 2020 compared to 
2002-level, the remaining amount of increased renewable energy production in 2012 is 
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13,16 TWh. From January 1st 2012 Norway will be entering the Swedish market and 
will thus have the same targets as Sweden. That means that from 2012 and by 2020 
there will be developed of at least 26,32 TWh new renewable energy in these two 
countries combined as a result of the joint green certificate market.  
During the three first years of the Swedish green certificate market it was issued more 
certificates than demanded. This led to an over-supply of certificates in the market and 
caused the prices of the certificates to decrease. The accumulated surplus of certificates 
lasted for three years, as the certificates were issued without a due date and could be 
saved for later years when the prices were higher. In 2006 the market experienced a 
change, as the amount of annulled certificates exceeded the amount of issued 
certificates (Swedish Energy Agency, 2010). This caused an increase in the certificate 
price as can be seen from figure 12.  
Figure 12: Average prices of green certificates in SEK from February 2003 to 
August 2009 
Source: Swedish Energy Agency, 2010 
Figure 12 shows the development of the certificate price in Sweden from February 2003 
to August 2009. From 2003 to 2006 the certificate price decreased, followed by an 
increase from 2006. A sudden change from decreasing certificate price to increasing 
certificate price could mean that several of the projects with lower development cost 
had been installed and that currently more expensive projects were being developed. 
Increased development costs as more expensive projects were put into operation 
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affected the certificate price, as shown in figure 6. Prior to the introduction of the green 
certificate market, Sweden had already developed several biomass power plants. With 
its large forests and land areas, Sweden has good conditions and knowledge for 
producing biomass at relatively low cost. When the green certificate market first was 
introduced, biomass covered most of the demand from new renewable energy. As the 
demand for additional new renewable energy increased as the quotas were increased, 
other more expensive sources had to be developed. Wind power plants were some 
examples of this. From 2006 the amount of wind power plants in Sweden increased, 
despite only generating a total of 2,5 TWh by the end of 2009 (Swedish Energy 
Agency, 2010).  
Even though Sweden had some start-up problems related to the issuing of certificates 
when the market first was introduced, the market has helped stimulating increased 
production of new renewable energy in the country. By the end of 2009 the real level of 
new renewable energy had reached 9,08 TWh (see table 2). The Swedish consumers’ 
total cost for the certificate market was SEK 3,8 million in 2007, where SEK 0,8 
million accounted for VAT (Prop.2008/09:163). It is reasonable to believe that Norway 
would take Sweden’s preface problems into account when the market expands to 
include Norway from January 1st 2012, and thus avoid some of the start-up problems as 
were seen in the Swedish market.  
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5 Discussion and analysis 
This part of the thesis will give attention to what the author perceive as the most 
outstanding arguments, concerns and issues that have been presented in the green 
certificate market debate. Analysis will be completed in order to understand the 
arguments, concerns and issues more clearly, to see what they are based on and whether 
they can be supported by economic theory.  
5.1  Producer and end-user prices 
“As a result of the green certificate market, the Nordic area will experience a power 
surplus that will lead to decreasing electricity prices”, is an expression from Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg (Glette, 2011). These are the same thoughts as Oil- and Energy 
Minister, Ola Borten Moe stated earlier this year. He said that by expanding the energy 
production in Norway and Sweden by the regulation of a green certificate market and at 
the same time hold back on the development of further energy cables to overseas 
countries, electricity prices would decrease and security of supply would increase 
(Dn.no). General economic theory supports Stoltenberg and Moe’s arguments. 
Implementation of a certificate market in Norway would mean that additional electricity 
sources would be developed. The production from new renewable sources would not 
replace already existing sources but come in addition to the current. Adding new supply 
to the market would shift the supply curve and lower the prices. Therefore, when supply 
of electricity in the energy market increases it is expected to cause a drop in the spot 
price, and thus also a lower consumer price if the decrease is larger than the certificate 
fee. How much the prices will decrease is dependent on the level of the quota. A higher 
purchaser commitment share equals not only increased development of new sources, 
additional electricity in the market and thus lower spot prices, but also increased 
certificate expenditures. Bye (2003) supports Stoltenberg and Moe’s argument and 
states that with increasing marginal costs in the supply and decreasing demand curves, 
it might lead to lower end-user prices on behalf of decreased profit for the green 
producers. The analysis of this argument is presented in figure 1311.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Based on Bye, T. 2003: On the Price and Volume Effects from Green Certificates in the Energy 
Market.  
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Figure 13: Price and volume effects of both traditional and green energy after the 
implementation of the green certificate market 
 
Source: Bye, 2003 
 
Initially, specific sources of green energy like wind and small-scale hydro h(p) are too 
expensive to penetrate the market at an initial system price of p0. With an electricity 
price, p0 a level of x* green electricity will be consumed, as more expensive sources 
will fall out from the market. The green electricity production needs to increase to a 
proportion higher than x* according to the RES-E Directive. However, the supply of 
new renewable technologies shifts to the right to h(p+pC) as the certificate market is 
being regulated and the certificate price, pC, works as a subsidy for the green producers 
in the market. The green sources that are able to penetrate the market at a price p0 is 
given by g(p). Thus, the aggregate supply of green electricity is given by g(p) + h(p+pC) 
after the market regulation. The total required demand for green electricity imposed by 
the annual certificate quota is given by f(p+αpC). The intersection between the 
aggregate supply curve g(p) + h(p+pC) and the aggregate demand curve f(p+αpC) 
generates the new system price, p* and the amount of green energy consumed, x**. We 
see that the amount of green energy in the market has increased, while the electricity 
price has decreased due to the additional green supply. Since p* is lower than p0, the 
spot price has decreased as a result of introducing a market for green certificates. If the 
total price (electricity price + certificate price) for the end-users actually is lower or 
higher than the initial electricity price depends on the certificate price. With a low 
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electricity price due to large additional supply from new renewable sources, the 
consumer price will be lower with a green market than without. Consumers would then 
benefit from the introduction of the market as the consumer surplus increases.  
 
However, since the Nordic electricity market has been liberalised and is open for trade, 
these results are to large extent not applicable for Norway, as the analysis is based on an 
autarky market model. Norway is part of a larger joint Nordic electricity market where 
there are several small electricity producers and grid connections make trade possible. 
Borten Moe’s statement of slowing down the development of further energy 
connections seems to be inconsistent with Statnett’s development and operations, as 
additional export cables are being planned and constructed. “Skagerrak” with a capacity 
of 700 MW is under construction and will be ready to transport electricity from Norway 
to Denmark from 2014. “NORDLINK”, an underwater cable from Norway to Germany 
with a capacity of 1000 MW is currently in the planning phase, the same is a cable 
between Norway and England that would connect the Nordic power market with the 
British (Statnett, 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the initial increase in 
new renewable energy in Norway would only have a minor impact on the system price 
due to export and trade. The initial increased green production in Norway will be too 
small to influence the Nordic market prices significantly, as small changes in one 
country will be relatively modest in a larger market.  
 
ECON Analyse (2004), on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
has conducted an analysis of the impacts on producer prices with a quota of 8 TWh in 
2016. From the calculations made by the Norwegian energy authorities we see that the 
level of the actual quota in 2016 will be 7,33 TWh (10,8%), which is close the level 
ECON is using in their predictions. ECON’s results of the forecasts of the wholesale 
prices are thus to a large extent relevant. 
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Figure 14: Changes in wholesale prices (NOK øre/KWh) with a quota of 8 TWh in 
2016 
Source: ECON Analyse, 2004 
As can be seen from the figure above, prices will start to decrease some years after the 
market has been regulated. This is due to the latency it takes from the market regulation 
to the new renewable sources are put into operation. As seen in previous chapters, the 
certificate market makes it profitable to invest in the development of electricity sources 
that otherwise would be too expensive to penetrate the market. Some investors are thus 
waiting to invest in new renewable energy sources until the certificate market is up and 
running. ECON thus expects a “rush” in projects being developed in the early stages of 
the market introduction. Many of these sources likely will not be ready to produce 
electricity until some time after the regulation. According to ECON, there will therefore 
be a period with sudden excess supply of electricity in the market, pressing the prices 
down. However, the changes in wholesale prices are marginal after the market has had 
some time to adjust to the sudden additional supply. New renewable sources will be 
developed in a smoother pace and prices will thus adjust back to the basic scenario. 
From ECON’s analysis we see that the impacts for the Swedish wholesale producers are 
expected to be approximately the same as for the Norwegian. 
Consumer prices consist of more than just wholesale power prices. VAT, grid fees, 
electricity taxes and average certificate cost per KWh consumption also have to be 
taken into account. When the green certificate market will be in place from January 1st 
next year, electricity consumers will be facing an extra expenditure on top of the 
electricity price, as illustrated in figure 6. Consumer price of electricity will thus be 
equal to P0  + (α*Q0)*PGC = PT, where α is the green quota share. Whether end-user 
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prices of electricity increase or decrease as a result of regulating the green certificate 
market is dependent on the price of the certificates, which in turn is dependent on the 
level of the annual quota, α and the system price. The prices for the end-users will 
increase by increasing quota, but the effect on consumer prices is low with a low quota. 
The following graph illustrates the changes in end-user prices for household customers 
in NOK øre/KWh with a quota of 8 TWh in 2016.  
Figure 15: Changes in end-user prices with a quota of 8 TWh in 2016 
Source: ECON Analyse, 2004 
The graph illustrates that there will be an increase in end-user prices for Norwegian 
consumers as a result of the market regulation. The increase is expected to be smaller in 
the first years after the market regulation than in the years that follows due to increasing 
annual quota. The increase will drop a little in the years close up to 2016 despite a 
higher quota. This is due to lower certificate prices, caused by an increasing supply of 
green energy as more sources are being developed over time. Swedish electricity 
consumers will on the other hand experience lower prices when Norway implements 
the green market. This is due to increased supply of certificates when Norway is joining 
the market. The results from ECON’s analysis are that changes in wholesale prices will 
be marginal and that consumer prices will increase with the introduction of a green 
certificate market.  
There is large uncertainty related to ECON’s results. The analysis is old and at the time 
the study was conducted, the information about the ambitions and the structure of the 
joint market was not available. The analysis is thus performed with uncertainty of how 
much new renewable electricity that will be developed in Norway. The green certificate 
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market policy scheme is constructed so that additional new renewable energy sources 
will be developed over time, as it takes time from planning to operation for these 
technologies. When the supply of green energy is increasing in a faster pace than grids 
and cables are being expanded, the market balance would be changed and the excess 
supply of energy will push the electricity prices down. Nordic Energy Perspectives 
(NEP), an interdisciplinary Nordic energy research project, concludes that the Nordic 
electricity prices in 2020 will be significantly lower than before the market regulation, 
as future grid connections will not have sufficient capacity to export all the redundant 
electricity from the Nordic market. This is illustrated in figure 16.  
 
Figure 16: Clear three-way division of price levels in 2020 with the hydro-area, 
Finland-Norway-Sweden at the lower end. 
 
Source: Nordic Energy Perspectives, 2008 
With increased RES-E in the Nordic countries (mainly Norway, Sweden and Finland), 
there would be a significant electricity surplus in this area. Due to insufficient grid and 
cable connections to the continental Europe, the spot prices would decrease. The price 
decreases in Germany and the Netherlands would be much smaller than for the Nordic 
countries, as the electricity market in Germany is significantly larger.  
THEMA Consulting Group (2011) agrees with NEP’s price forecasts and states that 
additional supply from new renewable energy sources of 10 TWh will add to existing 
electricity generation and decrease spot prices in Norway. According to the Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy’s quota determination (Refer to table 1), additional 
green production will exceed 10 TWh by the end of 2018. If the forecasted increase in 
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green energy is correct, a decrease in spot price will be seen in the Nordic area in the 
medium to long run.  
Despite ECON’s analysis results being inconsistent with NEP and THEMA Consulting 
Group’s findings, the regulation of a joint Swedish-Norwegian green certificate market 
would cause increased RES-E in both countries, which would press the spot prices 
down. The current power grid is currently close to reaching its limits. It is therefore 
expected that maintenance of the already existing transmission lines would be 
prioritized over further development of new grid connections and cables (Aadland, 
2011). Nevertheless, how much the electricity prices decrease is dependent on the 
export quota, as well as weather and wind conditions. Dry years will decrease the 
renewable electricity supply and thus cause higher prices. It is therefore hard to make 
accurate forecasts of the changes in producer prices other than concluding with a price 
decrease.  
With decreased producer prices, end-user prices will be affected. If the certificate price 
turns out to be larger than the gain from falling system price, the end-user price will 
increase. If the certificate price on the other hand turns out to be lower than the decrease 
in system price, consumer prices will decrease. Experiences from the Swedish green 
certificate market illustrates that the certificate expenditures for Swedish consumers has 
had an increasing trend from the introduction in 2003 to stagnation around 2008 (see 
figure 17). This is due to the fact that the certificate price is increasing with increased 
amount of green energy. Therefore, even with a decrease in wholesale prices, consumer 
prices might increase after the regulation of the green certificate market. However, 
given a Norwegian quota commitment of 3 percent in 2012 and a consumer’s average 
annual electricity consumption of 20.000 KWh, the certificate expenditures would only 
add up to NOK 181,50 per year for this consumer12. In other words, the system price 
does not have to decrease greatly in order for consumers to become better off during the 
first year of the market regulation. With a quota of 18,3 percent in 2020 on the other 
hand, the average consumer’s certificate expenditures will rise to NOK 1107 per 
annum. According to NEP though, the spot prices would be at its lowest in 2020 (refer 
to figure 16), which might would make up for the increasing certificate cost. End-user 
prices are thus expected to decrease as a result of the green market regulation.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The calculations are based on a certificate price of NOK 24,2 øre/KWh and 25 percent VAT.  
	  	   45	  
Figure 17: Certificate price for consumers in SEK øre/KWh 
 
Source: Swedish Energy Agency, 2010 
 
5.2  Security of supply and the energy balance  
Import is a part of the supply side of the Norwegian economy, also when it comes to 
energy. Trade of electricity is fluent between grid-connected countries due to price 
variations, as a country would choose to import cheap electricity and export when 
domestic prices are higher. The Norwegian energy balance shows that Norway has been 
switching between being a net importer and a net exporter of energy during the last 
years. In 2010 Norway imported 7,5 TWh electricity, thus the net energy balance for 
Norway was negative. Increased share of renewable energy production would make 
Norway less dependent on imported energy to meet the demand, as the excess 
production from new renewable energy sources would come in addition to the current 
production.  
 
The following analysis13 shows how Norway’s export of electricity would increase with 
the introduction of a green certificate market. The analysis is conducted with the 
assumption of not fully utilized grid capacities. The wholesale prices would thus not be 
affected and consumer prices will increase (Bye et al, 2002). This causes the demand 
for electricity to decrease in the long run.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Based on Bye, T. 2003: On the Price and Volume Effects from Green Certificates in the Energy 
Market.  
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Figure 18: Export of energy and the effect of green certificates 
 
Source: Bye, 2003 
 
With increased production from new renewable sources Norway would be a net 
exporting country at fixed prices. Domestic demand is given by the downward sloping 
curve DD to the left of A, and exports are given by the infinitely elastic part of demand 
(the horizontal line between A and B) as long as transmission capacity is sufficient. The 
downward sloping part of demand, D, to the right of B is the remaining domestic 
demand when transmission capacity is exceeded. Supply is given by the normal upward 
continuous sloping curve, since exporting implies just domestic supply in this market. 
Demand is infinitely elastic around equilibrium (P1, X1). Domestic demand is A, export 
is (X1 – A), while transmission capacity is B – A. The requirement for consumers to 
purchase green certificates is analogue to a purchase tax, and will cause an inward shift 
in the domestic demand curve (to the dashed line). The domestic certificate income on 
green production, which is analogue to a subsidy, will shift the domestic supply curve 
outwards (to the new dashed supply curve). The shifts in both domestic supply and 
demand curves do not change the energy price, P1 as long as transmission capacity 
limits are not exceeded. The domestic purchaser price increases to P2, and domestic 
demand decreases to X2. Increased domestic supply and reduced domestic demand both 
contribute to increased exports by (A - X1) + (B’ - X1). Since the export increases, the 
market for green certificates has led to improved security of supply in Norway and 
increased the likelihood of being self-supplied with energy in a normal year. Green 
producers will benefit from increasing production, while the consumer surplus will 
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decrease as consumer prices are increasing with positive and increasing certificate 
price. This causes the domestic demand for energy to decrease and more of the 
electricity production could be exported. If however, the Norwegian production 
increases by a so large amount that the transport capacity in the grid is completely 
utilized, the market would be similar to an autarky as no further export is possible. 
Under autarky, consumer prices would decrease and there would be a redistribution of 
surplus from producers to the consumers, as the extra expenditures related to increased 
use of renewable energy would be paid by the producers in the conventional energy 
market (Bye et al, 2002).  
 
Bye (2003) illustrated that the Norwegian electricity export would increase with the 
regulation of a certificate market. Additionally, the following analysis14 illustrates that 
the lower wholesale prices, the larger export. NEP and THEMA conclude that spot 
prices would be lowest when RES-E is highest. The export would thus be highest 
around 2020 when the increased RES-E in Norway have reached 13,2 TWh.  
 
Figure 19: Illustration of effect of renewable investments on Nordic export 
 
 
 
Source: THEMA Consulting Group, 2011 
 
Figure 19 shows the price duration curves for Norway and for a thermal system 
“outside” Norway. A price duration curve sorts the prices of a year according to 
decreasing value. Since hydropower is flexible, the Norwegian price duration curve is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Based on THEMA Consulting Group in association with vivideconomics, THEMA Report 2011-2: 
Renewables and Emissions – The Effect of Norwegian Renewable Investments on Carbon Emissions 
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almost flat, whereas the thermal price duration curve is S-shaped with a large spread. 
When the thermal price is higher than the Norwegian price, we have export from 
Norway to the thermal market, and when prices in the thermal market are lower, we 
have import to Norway. The intersection between the price curves outside Norway and 
the price curves for Norway equals the level of the Norwegian export. We see that with 
lower prices in Norway export increases significantly. Thus, a green certificate market 
would increase export, but it is the wholesale prices in Norway relative to the wholesale 
prices outside Norway that determines the quantity of electricity exported.  
 
Norwegian energy authorities have stated that one of their targets is to be self supplied 
with energy in a normal year. Increased RES-E increase the electricity surplus and since 
demand in the short run is assumed to be inelastic, export could increase as seen from 
the analysis in figure 18 and 19. Politicians like Jens Stoltenberg and lobbyist Frederic 
Hauge from the environmental NGO Bellona, have both in this context expressed their 
visions of Norway being “Europe’s green battery”. With increased renewable 
production as a result of the RES-E Directive, Norway could export more of its 
electricity production to other European countries that are dependent on a net import of 
energy. With its advantageous potential for increased production of renewable energy, 
Norway could function as a “battery” that supplies Europe with electricity. The idea is 
that water in certain reservoirs could be pumped up in higher storages if there is an 
over-supply of production when the windmills in Northern Europe is producing 
excessive supply of cheap electricity that is not needed elsewhere. Already today 
Norway is functioning as a “green battery” for Denmark. When the Danish wind power 
generation is low, Denmark is dependent on Norwegian hydropower to ensure security 
of electricity supply. Norwegian electricity producers, both traditional and green, would 
benefit from increased renewable energy production and closer grid connections with 
Sweden and the continental Europe as energy trade could be increased (Gullberg, 
2011).  
 
It is necessary to emphasize the idea of Norway as “Europe’s green battery” a little 
further. First of all, there is a substantial size difference between the Danish and the 
European market. The Danish energy market is small and thus Norwegian electricity 
production could contribute to ensure security of supply in this market. The 
German/European market is on the other hand relatively much larger, and thus the 
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Norwegian excess green supply would be too small to influence the market’s power 
balance substantially. As we have seen in the price analysis in chapter 5-1, the 
additional green supply resulting from the regulation of the certificate market would 
only lead to small wholesale price changes in the Netherlands and Germany when 
certificates are tradable. Therefore, the influence additional Norwegian or Nordic green 
supply would have on a large European market would be small.  
 
Even with increases RES-E in Norway, the transmission capacity from Norway to 
Europe would be insufficient to supply the market with substantial shares of additional 
electricity. Jørgen Kildahl, board management member in E.ON., expresses that if 
Norway has a vision of being a “green battery”, grid connections and cables have to be 
developed at a much faster pace than today. Europe is not waiting for Norway, he 
states, if Norway is too slow the European market would find another solution (Nilsen, 
2011). Capacity problems could thus be an obstacle for increased export of Norwegian 
electricity (Rosendahl, 2010).  
  
5.3  Volatility in certificate prices 
Criticism of the green certificate market often concern the varying prices a certificate 
market would cause in terms of electricity expenditures for the consumers and 
certificate income for the green producers. The combination of inelastic demand and 
significant volatility in electricity production from renewable technologies due to 
shifting weather conditions leads to volatile spot prices. Fluctuating energy production 
characterizes a whole range of renewable energy technologies, especially wind. In a 
green market with fixed demand, this might cause great volatility in the prices of the 
certificates. Additionally, these price changes may occur within a short period of time 
(Morthorst, 2000). Since new renewable energy technologies that will be assigned 
rights to receive certificates in Norway mostly involve small-scale hydro and wind 
power, variations in wind and rainfall will lead to volatilities in the certificates price as 
spot market prices influence the prices in the certificate market.  
Another factor influencing the volatility in certificate prices is the level of the 
renewable quota. It is difficult to decide the share of renewable energy in the total 
energy consumption for every year, when the exact level of renewable energy 
production cannot be forecasted. The energy authorities’ main objective is to set the 
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quota so that sufficient amount of RES-E is being produced. If the level of the quota 
were too low, the certificate prices would decrease so that development of new 
renewable technologies might not be ensured. If the level of the quota on the other hand 
were too high and the certificate price reached the maximum price, the optimal capacity 
development would be lower than the desired level. It would be a deficit in the 
certificate supply, causing the electricity consumers to pay the penalty for the 
unfulfilled share of renewable consumption even though they had no opportunity to get 
hold of more certificates. Thus, in order for the market to function like it is supposed to, 
the quota has to be as precise as possible for each specific year’s renewable energy 
production.  
 
Even though Norway’s electricity production is particularly vulnerable to weather 
conditions, the volatility in the certificate prices could be significantly lowered with the 
opportunity of certificate banking. When the supply of electricity from renewable 
sources is high, the price of the certificates will decrease. This creates an opportunity 
for consumers or traders to buy more certificates than one needs and bank them to cover 
future obligations. This is possible because the certificates will be issued without an 
expiry date. The banking of certificates will create advantages for both consumers and 
producers of new renewable energy, as the certificate prices would become more stable. 
The banking situation is analysed in figure 2015.  
Figure 20: How banking might reduce the price volatility in the green certificate 
market 
 
Source: Morthorst, 2000 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Based on Morthorst, P.E. (2000): The development of a green certificate market 
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The dashed line DWB represents the situation where it is possible to buy additional 
certificates at a low price due to excess supply and bank them for upcoming years when 
the certificate prices might be higher, or the case where one uses some already banked 
certificates if the price of certificates is higher than expected. In relation to the wind 
variability problem, banking limits the price range to P2B – P3B, a considerably smaller 
range than in the case with no banking opportunity. Without banking the price range 
would be P2 – P3, which is the span from the maximum/penalty price to the minimum 
price. Certificate prices could vary between the maximum price and the minimum price 
within short period of time if certificate banking was not possible. Thus, with a 
narrower price range, volatility would decrease. The analysis shows that the opportunity 
to bank certificates creates a more stable certificate price, which is advantageous for 
both electricity consumers who have to pay for these certificates, and for new 
renewable energy producers who are dependent on the income from these certificates. 
A banking situation thus leads to higher predictability for both parties in terms of 
income for the green producers and electricity expenditure for the consumers. Potential 
investors of development of new renewable sources will also be able to make more 
accurate forecasts in the subsidies in terms of certificate income they can expect to 
receive.  
 
Furthermore, in a situation with deficit of certificates (demand of certificates excess 
supply) and the certificates only are valid for one year, the excess demand will be 
converted to the penalty payment for the consumers. Since there are too few certificates 
on the market, it is impossible for the consumers to get hold of enough to fulfil their 
required share. With an external validity and the possibility of certificate banking, 
certificates banked in previous years might cover this excess demand and in this way 
moderate the irregular supply of certificates to the market. Again, the banking 
opportunity proves to ensure a more stable certificate price, which has been one of the 
strongest criticisms of the certificate market.  
 
Another important aspect is that a larger European market, that might be the reality in 
the long run, would get rid of some of the volatility. With a larger European market 
there would be additional and diversified green suppliers. Weather- and wind 
conditions are significantly different in Norway and Sweden than in other European 
countries, and a larger market might also diversify the portfolio of new renewable 
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technologies. Thus, the volatility in the production output of the portfolio of new 
renewable technologies is likely to decrease as additional technologies and production 
areas are entering the market. In addition, the problem of determining an annual 
accurate quota will diminish when the market expands. Problems with covering the 
national quotas could be solved by import of certificates, while a surplus of certificates 
could be exported to countries that are lacking certificates. The national quota 
determination will thus get less complicated (Morthorst, 2000). 
 
5.4  Impacts on CO2-emissions 
The regulation of a certificate market will lead to increased production of new 
renewable energy. Since consumers are obliged to buy a certain share of energy from 
these sources, domestic consumption of other traditional sources like large-scale hydro, 
heating oil, kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) will decrease, unless the 
demand for these energy sources is totally inelastic (Bye, 2003). How much the demand 
for other energy sources will decrease depends on the consumers’ total electricity 
consumption, how sensitive their consumption is to an increase in the energy prices and 
the renewable energy quota. If the government imposes a higher green energy share, the 
introduction of green certificates becomes a strain on the traditional energy market, and 
the traditional energy producers lose profit (Bye, 2003).  Hence, green certificates 
contribute to an emission reduction of green house gases in Norway as the certificate 
market to some extent causes lower domestic consumption of fossil fuels (Bye and 
Hoel, 2009). The Zero Emission Resource Organisation (ZERO) states that Norwegian 
GHG emission could be reduced by 11 million tons with the implementation of the 
RES-E Directive (Lunde, 2010). The effect a green certificate market would have on 
the traditional energy market is illustrated below16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Based on Bye, T. 2003: On the Price and Volume Effects from Green Certificates in the Energy 
Market.  
	  	   53	  
Figure 21: Effects of green certificates in the traditional energy market 
 
Source: Bye, 2003 
 
Before the introduction of the green certificate market, equilibrium is given by (p0, x0), 
where p0 is the price for the traditional producers and x0 is the amount of traditional 
energy in the market. The green certificate purchaser commitment will shift the demand 
curve inwards in two steps; the first step from f(p) to f(p+αpc). This step is related to 
the increased effective purchaser price, which is equivalent to the effect of introducing a 
tax on energy (αpc). The inward shift would create a new equilibrium in (p1, x1) where 
the purchaser price equals (p1 + αpc). However, only a fraction (1-α) of total demand 
may be satisfied by traditional energy. In the second step the demand curve twists 
downwards to the left, from f(p+αpc) to (1-α) f(p+αpc). This twist is a result of the 
commitment the consumers have to consume a share α of new renewable energy 
instead of traditional energy. The new equilibrium price and volume for the traditional 
energy producers is (p*, x*), while the consumer price of traditional energy increases to 
Pw. The introduction of green energy will thus displace traditional energy, as the 
amount of energy from the traditional energy producers has decreased from x0 to x* 
(Bye, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, there are currently carbon emissions taxes on heating oil and 
transportation in Norway.  If the subsidy effect of new renewable energy is stronger 
than the effect of the current carbon taxes, consumer prices on electricity will decrease, 
as was being discussed in section 5.1. The analysis performed by NEP and THEMA 
Consulting stated that consumer prices most likely will decrease when the certificate 
market is being introduced, due to a decrease in the spot price in the medium to long 
run. The consumption of electricity will thus rise while the consumption of oil will 
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decrease. This will lead to lower emission of green house gases in Norway (Bye and 
Hoel, 2009). Håvard Lundberg, climate- and energy consultant at Bellona, agrees with 
the analysis above and states that the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy is 
critical in order to reduce Norwegian GHG emissions (Bellona, 2011).  
 
The above arguments include some statements that call for additional assessment. In 
figure 21 the analysis showed that when more green electricity enters the market, it 
would replace some of the traditional energy. That argument is correct, however only in 
an autarky. In an open market where trade is fluent, the excess energy production would 
be exported and thus not replace traditional production. The level of green house gas 
emissions in Norway would thus not decrease as long as transmission connections are 
sufficient. Furthermore, even with a decrease in end-user prices, it is less likely that it 
will lead to increased consumption of electricity that would replace the consumption of 
oil. Price-elasticity of energy consumption tends to be low due to little room for 
substitution. However, consumer prices of electricity might also increase in the long run 
when the quota and thus the certificate cost increase. This causes a decrease in the 
demand for electricity. Even with little room for substitution, some consumers might 
switch from electricity to an increasing use of fossil fuels for household heating. An 
increase in use of fossil fuels would lead to increasing green house gas emissions in 
Norway.  
 
Additionally, increased renewable energy production in Norway will most likely not 
lead to reduced green house gas emissions in Europe. The European Union has decided 
on a cap on carbon emissions. Therefore, even though exported Norwegian green 
electricity might replace coal fired power generation in Denmark, the resulting excess 
quotas would be assigned other polluting industries, like for instance German concrete 
production. The amount of green house gas emissions within the European Union 
would thus be unaffected by a possible emission reduction in Norway (Bye and Hoel, 
2009). The climate effect of a green certificate market is hence doubtable. With 
increased renewable energy, demand for carbon quotas will decrease and thus the prices 
on the carbon emissions will decrease. With a lower carbon tax, emissions will increase 
since polluters would choose to pay for emitting green house gases instead of abating. 
The following graph illustrates this issue. When price per unit of emissions decreases, 
the level of emission increases. An emissions price of 7 dollars per unit would for 
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instance generate an emission level of 6, while an emission price of 4 dollar per unit on 
the other hand would generate an emission level of 18. 
Figure 22: Price per unit of emissions relative to level of emissions 
 
Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005 
On the contrary, lower CO2-prices are likely to induce a tighter emission cap in 
subsequent periods, as abatement becomes cheaper. Since the emission allowance cap is 
being tightened every year, it is not necessarily the case that the emission price will 
decrease when demand for the carbon quotas decreases. Furthermore, if the increased 
Norwegian exports replace more polluting energy sources abroad, European carbon 
emissions will be reduced. Hence, increased RES-E today implies reduced emissions in 
the medium to long term. If market participant expect tighter policies, banking will be 
increased, investment in fossil fuelled capacities postponed and R&D activities in clean 
technology stimulated. That means that short term emissions are likely to be reduced as 
well as it will be easier for regulators to tighten the emission cap (THEMA, 2011).  
The increased development of new renewable energy sources caused by the market for 
green certificate will make it easier in the longer run to set stricter emission targets and 
requirements than it would be without the green certificate market. An increased 
reduction in carbon emissions in the following years is necessary in order for Norway 
to reach the target of 30 percent reduction compared to 1990 level. It is therefore 
important not to analyse the impacts of the green certificate within a static framework 
given the current climate targets, but rather analyse the market implications with the 
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focus on the opportunities it gives in the long run. A long view perspective is important 
in terms of reaching the ambitious targets of the climate policies Norway has decided 
on if we are to avoid the most severe consequences of global warming (Alfsen, 2009).  
 
Moreover, a fee on electrical consumption, as the green certificates impose, creates a 
greater awareness of the link between energy consumption and climate change. By 
placing the responsibility of financing renewable energy sources over to the consumers, 
their awareness of the climate challenges might increase, and many consumers will thus 
find it fair to include the externality costs of their energy consumption in addition to the 
real costs. The increasing focus on combating climate change will thus have a broader 
support among the energy consumers, as they are paying extra to contribute to lower 
emissions (Morthorst, 2000).  
 
40 percent of the energy consumption is exempted from participating in the certificate 
market. Hagem and Rosendahl (2011) argue that energy intensive industry will 
experience lower electricity prices as a result of the market regulation, which will lead 
to increased activity and thus an increase in emissions. As seen in chapter 5.1, 
wholesale prices would decrease after the regulation of the green certificate market, if 
not transmission capacities are being improved and developed. Additionally, if the 
market participants do not expect regulations to be tightened in the future, as the carbon 
quota prices decrease, the effect on emissions via banking, investments and R&D 
activities will be weaker and in the worst-case negative, leading to increase in GHG 
emissions. Furthermore, as stated earlier, increased renewable investments in Norway 
would be marginal in a European and global context. It might be naive to believe that 
increased RES-E in Norway and Sweden will have such a large impact on the carbon 
prices in the European Union that it induces a tightening of the carbon cap. 
Nevertheless, all increases in renewable investments are marginal, and since every 
European Union member country has to stimulate increasing RES-E according to the 
Directive, the total effect of aggregate increased RES investments might be significant 
in the climate policy and lead to a tighter emissions standard in the future (THEMA, 
2011).  After all, the future aim is to expand the Swedish-Norwegian certificate market 
over time so that more countries are included in the scheme. The joint marginal 
emission reductions of the countries included in the certificate market measure would 
then be significant.  
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5.5  Cost-efficiency 
 
Today’s subsidy scheme for renewable energy is constructed so that different projects 
are being assigned funds after an application process. The funding organ responsible for 
assigning the different projects with subsidies has diminutive information about what 
are the best projects – i.e. how much green energy that could be produced given the 
amount of the subsidies relatively to the amount of green production that have been 
promised to be delivered in the application prospect. The public sector has limited 
information, and many investors could take advantage of this and over-estimate their 
need for governmental funding. Investors may overestimate the capacity of their power 
plant and apply for larger funding than they actually need in order to make their 
projects as profitable as possible. In an article published by “Teknisk Ukeblad”, Nilsen 
and Lie (2011) revealed that Norwegian wind farms yearly produce 25 percent less 
electricity than what the investors had promised in their application for development 
subsidies. Norwea, an interest and lobbying organization working for promoting 
Norwegian renewable energy, admits that the potential for wind power capacity in 
Norway has been overestimated. President of the Norwegian Society for the 
Conservation of Nature, Lars Haltbrekken, is thus sceptical to the current wind power 
subsidy scheme and says that large nature intervention that only leads to minor energy 
production is inefficient management of the resources (Nilsen and Lie, 2011). In a 
certificate scheme however, the market itself would carry the costs of poor projects and 
it would be a strong incentive for cost-efficiency. If the certificate market works as it is 
supposed to and negative externalities are being internalised in the market, there would 
be no dead weight loss, as is the case for the current scheme of governmental subsidies 
(Bye, Greaker and Rosendahl, 2002).  
Economists like Hagem and Rosendahl (Samfunnsøkonomen nr. 3 2011) have, on the 
contrary, criticised the green certificate measure of not being an efficient way of 
reducing GHG emissions. Economic efficiency is defined as the maximization of 
aggregate consumer and producer surplus (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005). Economics 
of climate change and environmental economics state that in order to gain cost-
efficiency in increasing one specific good, i.e. new renewable energy production, the 
other good (fossil fuels) has to be taxed instead of subsidising the desired good. A 
certificate market would however, subsidise green electricity instead of including the 
marginal external cost of fossil fuels in the cost function. To subsidise a “correct” price 
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determined by the market while leaving the negative externalities caused by polluting 
goods untaxed is an “incorrect” price, as marginal external costs are not included. It is 
also in conflict with general economic terms (Haugneland, 2011). An illustration of 
efficiency gains and losses arising as a result of taxing polluting goods, and as result of 
subsidising green energy production will be compared in the analysis in figure 23 and 
24 below.  
Figure 23: Efficiency gain when negative externalities of polluting goods are 
included in the supply  
 
 
Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005 
 
Figure 23 shows the market demand and supply curves, where S=MC. The intersection 
between these curves gives us the price, P1 and the output, Q1 of polluting goods. The 
external cost curve (MEC) represents the increase in harm to society as the polluting 
industry increases its output by one unit. In the “business-as-usual” scenario, these costs 
are not included in the industry’s supply curve. From a social point of view, the 
polluting industry thus produces too much output which causes pollution. The efficient 
level of output is hence the level at which the price of the polluting good is equal to the 
marginal social cost of production. Marginal social cost of production is the sum of the 
production costs and the marginal external costs (MC + MEC). When putting a tax on 
polluting goods, marginal external costs are being included in the cost function of the 
production. We then get a new supply curve, illustrated by the MSC curve. The 
intersection between the marginal social cost curve and the demand curve gives us the 
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new equilibrium. The quantity of polluting goods will then decrease to Q* and the price 
of polluting goods will increase to P*. Due to excess production of polluting goods in 
the “business-as-usual” scenario, an economic inefficiency equal to the green area is 
present. By imposing a tax on polluting goods due to the negative externalities their 
production creates, this economic inefficiency disappears. Tax on polluting goods is 
thus an efficient policy.  
 
A subsidy to producers of new renewable energy would on the other hand be less cost- 
efficient, as illustrated in the figure 24. The value of the subsidy payment is given by 
the area a+b+c+d+e+f. After the introduction of the subsidy, the change in consumer 
surplus is c+d+f and the change in producer surplus is a+b. Net benefits equal change in 
consumer surplus plus change in producer surplus minus subsidy payment = (c,d,f) + 
(a,b) – (a,b,c,d,e,f) = e which is a dead weight loss. There is hence a net welfare loss 
related to introducing the green certificate market in general economic terms. The 
yellow area indicates the inefficiency.  
 
Figure 24: Efficiency loss resulting from subsidising green energy production 
 
Source: own figure 
 
This example illustrates how the desired outcome of increased new renewable energy 
would be reached in a more cost-efficient way with a tax on polluting goods than with a 
subsidy in terms of green certificates. However, the case with introducing a green 
certificate market is more complex than what the above analysis illustrates. As the 
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following part explains, the outcomes of the cost-benefit analysis changes when one 
takes the RES-E Directive into account.  
 
In the report “1/2005 Pliktige elsertifikater”, Golombek and Hoel argue that a green 
certificate market would be a cost-efficient tool if Norway implements the European 
Union’s RES-E Directive. By using the numerical model LIBEMOD (Liberalization 
Model of the European Energy Markets) Golombek and Hoel conclude that a market 
for green certificate is a cost-efficient measure for reaching the renewable target. The 
two economists have analysed the scenario where Norway and Sweden have a joint 
certificate market and where the quota is set to 5, 10 or 20 percent. Their calculations 
prove that even with a quota as low as 5 percent, investments in wind power in Norway 
would be profitable. Furthermore, Norway would always have a positive net present 
value from the certificates in a joint market with Sweden (Golombek and Hoel, 2005). 
Bye (2003) supports the argument that green certificates is a cost-efficient tool; “An 
advantage of this green certificate instrument over a simple price and standard 
investment subsidy instrument is that the certificate market will contribute to a cost-
efficient solution in the energy market under the green energy production share 
constraint. The green commitment share and the definition of green technologies is a 
governmental issue”. Del Rio (2005) agrees with Golombek and Hoel’s arguments. He 
states that the RES-E Directive targets could be reached at a much lower cost in a joint 
national support scheme combined with tradable green certificates. The following 
analysis17 illustrates why that is the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Based on Del Rio, P. (2005): A European-wide harmonised tradable green certificate scheme for 
renewable electricity: is it really so beneficial 
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Figure 25: Cost of reaching the RES-E target for the two countries in autarky and 
in a joint market 
 
 
Source: own figure  
 
Figure 25 is a two panel diagram showing the RES marginal cost curves for two 
countries, Sweden and Norway, referred to as respectively country A and country B. 
When the two countries aim to reach the RES-E individually QA = QB, country A would 
have a much higher marginal cost (MCA) in reaching the target than country B (MCA > 
MCB). The cost of reaching the RES-E target for country A is thus PA, which represents 
the certificate price in country A. The cost for reaching the target for country B is PB, 
which is the certificate price in country B. Even though both countries have the same 
level of ambition in the targets, country A would have a higher certificate price than 
country B due to higher marginal costs.  
 
If the two countries agreed on a harmonization of their policy support schemes in 
combination with tradable green certificates, the same amount of QA + QB could be 
reached but at a lower cost. Cost-efficiency will be gained when the two countries’ 
marginal cost curves (MCA=MCB) intersects, indicated by the red point. In a joint 
certificate market where both countries have the same RES-E target, the certificate 
price would be P* and the RES production for both countries would be Q*. With a 
certificate price of P* the expensive production of RES-E in country A would be 
reduced, the cheap production in country B would increase, and the aggregate 
compliance cost would decrease. Trade would then be driven by the possible gains for 
both countries with different marginal cost curves. Since country A has a higher 
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marginal cost curve for producing RES-E, the country will in a joint market have the 
opportunity to save costs by buying certificates from country B in order to reach its 
RES-E target instead of producing the total amount of RES-E themselves. Country B 
with lower marginal costs will on the other hand produce more RES-E and sell their 
excessive certificates to country A. Thus, the joint certificate market between Norway 
and Sweden would be cost-efficient and a win-win situation for both countries with the 
implementation of the RES-E Directive.  
 
This analysis illustrates that both countries individually would be better off if 
harmonization of support schemes combined with a TGC system was implemented. 
Country B would obtain additional revenues while country A would save costs. Not 
only would individual countries be better off, but also the overall target (i.e., RES-E 
Directive target) would be achieved at a lower cost. The reason harmonization with 
trade would be cost-efficient is that the equimarginal principle18 is accomplished. 
 
Søderholm (2008) has emphasised one of the major benefits of an integrated green 
certificate market from a cost-effectiveness point of view. A joint certificate market 
with Sweden could mean that consumers in Sweden for instance pay for the 
development of renewable power projects in Norway. That is because the scheme is 
technologically neutral, i.e. the cheapest sources would be developed first, regardless of 
where they are located. If for instance wind power is cheaper in Norway than in 
Sweden, the integration applies that the certificate fee paid by Swedish electricity 
consumers is reallocated from Swedish to Norwegian owners of wind power plants. 
Cost-efficiency will be gained when investments are made where they are cheapest and 
the aggregate cost of achieving the quota obligation is minimized. Also by expanding 
the market to include additional countries, the economic efficiency of the scheme would 
increase. A country with available green electricity or with potential to expand their 
green production to relatively low costs, could sell certificates to another country where 
renewable energy is more expensive. The buyer of the electricity could in this way fulfil 
part of its required quota, while green producers would have the possibility to finance 
even more of their production and investments in renewable energy. The result would 
be the same amount of renewable energy, but to a lower total cost (Søderholm, 2008). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Equimarginal Principle: The point at which consumption or production minimizes spending per unit 
consumed or produced. In environmental economics, the point at which desired emissions reductions for 
different firms are achieved at the minimum possible cost. 
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In a larger European market a few countries may take the lead and introduce a 
multilateral joint support scheme. The more countries that participate, the less sensitive 
the integrated system becomes to policy changes in one of the countries, which could 
affect the market mechanisms and thus the prices of the certificates.  
 
A joint green certificate market with Sweden will on the other side make it more 
difficult to control how much green electricity that is being produced domestically. This 
will again make it hard to determine if Norway has reach the RES-E Directive within 
2020. Additionally, the scheme does not comply with the required demand for reaching 
cost-efficiency in a renewable target according to Hagem and Rosendahl (2011), a 
statement contrary to the analysis from Golombek and Hoel presented above. One 
example is that a market for green certificates only includes new renewable energy, 
while the RES-E Directive on the other hand sets requirements to the total share of 
renewable energy in the consumption. Thus, the scheme as it currently is designed, does 
not give strong enough incentives to reduce the energy consumption. Another problem 
is that the market only includes the consumption of electricity while the RES-E 
Directive emphasises all energy consumption. The green certificate market will thus not 
give incentives to decrease consumption of other energy sources than electricity, if not 
the price of electricity decreases relative to other energy sources. Furthermore, green 
certificates will be an unsuitable measure for the Norwegian energy system. Norway 
has little electricity production based on non-renewable sources. The situation in the 
European Union however is completely different, as most of the energy consumption 
originates from fossil fuels. Thus, it might seem like a green certificate market would 
be more appropriate in the European market than in the Norwegian.  
 
The aim of the market is to increase the production of renewable energy in Norway. It 
takes time to develop new renewable sources as the planning and implementation stages 
normally takes many years. Other measures, such as increased direct subsidies or feed-
in tariffs, could ensure a steeper development rate than what the market for green 
certificates would do. However, the latency will increase the stability of renewable 
energy and make the long-term determination of the renewable quotas even more 
important (Morthorst, 2000).   
 
	  	   64	  
A green certificate market might in certain cases increase the expenditures for the 
government. If the market collapses due to disruptions in the market mechanisms, the 
price will either jump to the maximum price or fall to the minimum price. If the price 
reaches the minimum payment, the government would have to subsidize the difference 
in order to ensure that additional new renewable sources are being developed.   
 
5.6  Research and development  
Today’s subsidy scheme requires that the government must evaluate every project that 
is applying for subsidies through Enova SF. Thus, each project that applies for subsidy 
support has to be of a certain size and a have a satisfyingly large production capacity in 
order to justify all the costs related to application and case handling (Gran, 2004). This 
causes smaller renewable energy projects to fall out from the subsidy scheme and being 
left undeveloped due to lack of funds.  
The proposed green certificate market will on the other hand lead to a market based 
technology selection and investment allocation. This will most likely contribute to 
research and improvements of a mixture of renewable technologies. Improved 
technology is essential for developing various and innovative renewable energy 
sources, but has come to halt due to the higher expenditures related to these premature 
technologies than for the cheaper well-established hydropower. Increased production of 
a specific renewable energy source strengthens the knowledge, both in the respective 
industry and in other similar domestic industries, and lowers the costs. This causes the 
energy production to be more efficient also in other industries, as there will be positive 
externalities resulting from increased production (Golombek and Hoel, 2005). An 
increase in knowledge and technology improvements is important if we should be able 
to reduce emission of green house gases by a large amount in the future (Bye and Hoel, 
2009) and if the world aims to be less dependent on energy from fossil fuels in the 
coming decades.  
Since the green certificate market implementation will lead to a steeper development 
curve of technologies like wind energy, the demand for components for building wind 
turbines and other new renewable technologies will increase. Producers of renewable 
energy technologies would thus gain from the introduction of a green certificate market 
(Bye and Hoel, 2009). Increased knowledge and expertise in the technology of 
renewable energy development could make Norway gain competitive advantages within 
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the clean technology industry. Investors and companies’ focus on sustainable 
investments are globally increasing due to climate targets and energy crises, thus the 
demand for renewable technologies is expected to increase. Because of the green 
certificate market, Norway has a chance to become a pioneer in development of clean 
technology.  
The status quo is however not so simple. The third largest oil field in the Norwegian oil 
history, Aldous, was recently (2011) discovered on Norwegian shelf. Experts assume 
Aldous could contain as much as 3,3 billion barrels of oil. That indicates that the 
Norwegian petroleum industry would demand a large share of professionals in Norway. 
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) predicts that approximately NOK723 
billion would be invested on the Norwegian shelf during the four upcoming years as 
long as the oil price remains high (Øyehaug and Gaasemyr, 2011). This would mean a 
large increase in activity level for the oil service firms that supply oil companies with 
goods and services. Some of these companies might actually experience that they are 
not able to cover the increased demand from the oil sector. When the activity level 
increases, employment normally expands. Within the oil sector, the demand for 
engineers would be especially high. FMC Technologies, a provider of technology 
solutions to the energy industry, on average employs 50 workers every month, most of 
them engineers, and will hire approximately 400 to 600 new employees during 2012 
(Ree and Helgesen, 2011). However, in order to develop clean technology in the 
renewable energy sector, engineers are needed to stimulate innovation and new ideas. 
Since the petroleum industry is relatively much more competitive when it comes to 
salaries and payments for the employees than the renewable sector tend to be, the 
petroleum sector might seem more attractive for the main share of the Norwegian 
engineers. The availability of engineers who can contribute to R&D in the renewable 
energy sector would therefore decrease and research and development of new 
technologies might come to halt if not imported labour could make up for the petroleum 
sector’s dominating position.  
 
As stated earlier, a certificate market would mean that the most cost-efficient 
technologies would be developed first, where wind power and small-scale hydro would 
be the dominating new renewable energy sources in Norway. This is despite the fact 
that there would be more learning effects related to electricity production from 
immature technologies like tide- and wave energy than for well-known technologies 
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like hydro. Thus, in many cases it will lead to greater innovation and technology 
improvements if the funding of research, development and demonstration was targeted 
new technologies instead of subsidising small-scale hydro where the technology already 
is mature (Hagem and Rosendahl, 2011). Furthermore, in a situation where the 
investment resources are becoming scarce, which could be the case if there is a 
significant expansion of renewable capacity development, renewable energy 
technologies might become substitutes for each other instead of complementary 
technologies for promoting various new renewable energies. The need for 
complementary technologies is especially important in the long run if green house gases 
are to be reduced.  
Green certificates are one type of deployment subsidies, which means that they promote 
development of certain technologies (the ones the government has decided are green 
technologies), while taken the focus away from other technologies that are not seen as 
green. Thus, green certificates lead to no incentive for the single producer to invest in 
R&D if the results of the R&D will be available to all the producers in the same 
industry. R&D subsidies, not green certificate subsidies, will lead to increased focus on 
technology development and cost reductions targeted directly. Premature and unknown 
technologies could thus be subsidised more accurate, as certain shares of the funds 
could be assigned to specific technologies. Through a green market only the most 
efficient technologies would be developed while others would lack behind. This creates 
a “lock-in” of relatively efficient green technologies and a “lock-out” of immature 
green technologies. In this case, the green certificate market comes short and could 
prevent development of promising technologies with high learning curves, which yet is 
not as efficient as other green technologies. It could thus be necessary to engage in 
parallel subsidising schemes in order to ensure a diversification of the technology 
portfolio and to avoid a “lock-out” of promising technologies. Technology specific 
R&D funds such as investment subsidies and licences could be implemented parallel 
with the green market. However, interference might disturb the price determinations in 
the green certificate market and cause the market not to function as it is supposed to 
(Bye, Greaker and Rosendahl, 2002).  
 
Additionally, prices on carbon quotas will decrease with a regulation of the green 
certificate market. Lower prices on carbon emissions will make it less attractive to 
engage in research and development of new energy technologies. Further development 
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and improvement of relatively new technologies like energy conservation or CCS is 
important if green house gas emissions are to be reduced at a lower price in the future, 
and in order to make it easier for other countries to consent to stricter carbon emission 
agreements. As a paradox, a subsidy scheme like green certificates may cause 
difficulties in increasing the R&D activities within carbon abating projects and may 
prevent stricter climate policies of being introduced after 2020 (Bye and Hoel, 2009).  
 
5.7 Predictability of investment subsidies 
Today’s scheme where the research Council of Norway, Innovation Norway, Enova SF 
and other governmental organisations are the responsible organs of subsidising 
development of renewable energy strongly relies on political will. The funding structure 
becomes complex, and from one political period to another the parties responsible for 
assigning the organisations with funds that are to be used for subsidising renewable 
energy projects varies. Politicians and ministers from respective parties have different 
views and opinions about the importance of the development of new renewable energy 
technologies. This is influencing the level of the funds granted from the government to 
the funding organs and thus also impacts how much renewable energy is being 
developed and how fast. It leads to unpredictability in the subsidies of renewable 
energy and hence slows down the development. The graph in figure 26 below provides 
an overview of research-, development- and demonstration budgets for energy purposes 
in Norway from 1980 to 2009.  
Figure 26: Norwegian research-, development- and demonstration budgets for 
energy purposes 1980-2009 in billion Euros 
Source: Klitkou, 2011 
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We see that the research related subsidies for renewable energy have been significantly 
smaller than the subsidies for fossil fuels during the whole period. Public subsidies for 
energy purposes have largely been assigned fossil fuels, while the funding for 
hydropower has stagnated and led to a decline in the hydropower knowledge and 
competence in the Norwegian R&D environment (Klitkou, 2011). 
Even though public funds for supporting renewable energies like solar and wind have 
grown rapidly during the last years, these subsidies may change with shifting political 
governance. As times goes by and the political situation in Norway changes, it may 
happen that the subsidies of renewable energy are being cut off significantly. As the 
size of the subsidies is considerably variable, the potential investors’ interest in the 
development of renewable energy has been decreasing due to low predictability in 
subsidies (Gran, 2004). A market for green certificates, where the subsidies are paid 
directly from the consumers, might increase the predictability in development subsidies. 
However, since the price of the certificate varies with volatility in productions, the 
additional income for the green producers is being affected. As have been illustrated 
above, heavy rainfall and wind will lead to decreasing certificate prices while dry years 
with modest wind will lead to the opposite. Nevertheless, the analysis of certificate 
banking has shown that the volatility in certificate price, and thus also the income for 
the producers, would decrease when certificates are issued without a due date. This 
increases the predictability of income for the new renewable producers and might lead 
to more renewable projects being put into operation.  
Experiences from Sweden show that after a slow start the Swedish support system is 
now starting to bear fruit, and some leading international wind power developers have 
entered the Swedish market (Global Wind Energy Council, 2009). The table below 
presents a comparison of wind energy production in Sweden and Norway as of the end 
of 2010. 
Table 3: Wind power capacity and growth rate Norway and Sweden, 2010 
 
 Sweden Norway 
Installed capacity (2010) 2163 MW 441 MW 
Growth rate 28% 2% 
Source: Global Wind Energy Council, 2009 
As the table presents, the differences in installed wind capacity and growth rate in the 
wind industry is significantly larger in Sweden than in Norway. One should be careful 
to draw the conclusion that the Swedish green certificate market is the only reason for 
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the increased wind power development. However, it is reasonable to believe the market 
should have some of the honour, as it has attracted more foreign investors. The graph in 
figure 27 below shows that there has been an increase in the amount of wind power 
plants in Sweden after the introduction of the green certificate market in 2003.  
Figure 27: Total amount of new wind power plants in Sweden and their installed 
capacity 
 
Source: Swedish Energy Agency, 2010 
Søderholm (2008) on the other hand raises the question of whether political risk 
actually will decrease with the establishment of a green certificate market. The presence 
of two countries implies two different political wills when it comes to environmental 
and energy issues and thus doubles the complexity. Søderholm states that there exist a 
large number of interest groups, thereby politicians, that often have more specific 
expectations about the outcome of the system. Specific lobby groups in turn often 
represent the different energy technologies. When taking that into account, the 
likelihood of tensions between different interests (e.g. some cheering for wind power, 
others for bio-fuels) will arise and changes in the scheme may be initiated. An extended 
market may imply a larger number of potential conflicts about the design and outcomes 
of the system. Such changes due to pressure from different interests will cause a 
decrease in predictability of the subsidies, which might affect the development of new 
projects. However, all changes must not only be agreed on at a nationally basis, but two 
countries have to agree on any measures that would affect the scheme. Additionally, if 
conflicts occur one of the countries may want to abolish the joint market. Sweden and 
Norway have had different strategies in their energy and environmental policies. 
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Sweden has had a strong focus on renewable energy sources, while Norway has mainly 
given more emphasis on the use of natural gas and CCS.   
 
Nevertheless, Søderholm concludes that the size of the political risk probably will not 
increase as the number of countries participating in the scheme increases, e.g. with a 
larger European market. However, changes in one country may have profound impacts 
on the functioning of the market as a whole, and a low participation rate (like for the 
bilateral market between Sweden and Norway) makes the market more sensitive to 
policy changes. Since the joint green certificate market between Norway and Sweden 
currently only includes these two countries, the political risk facing investors will 
increase when Norway enters the market as of January 2012. The increased risk for 
investors might affect the development of new renewable energy projects, and the same 
development rate as has been seen in the Swedish wind power industry might not be the 
reality for Norway. President for the association for small-scale hydro, Henrik Glette, 
emphasize how important large markets are for the predictability of investment 
subsidies. He claims RES investments would come to halt if the government prevents a 
further development of overseas cable and grid connections (Tekna, 2011). 
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6  Conclusion  
The implementation of a joint green certificate market with Sweden will lead to 
consequences for Norway. As the regulation of the certificate market will lead to 
increased development of new renewable energy sources, spot prices on electricity will 
decrease. However, since Norway is part of a larger international electricity market, the 
exact decrease in system price is hard to forecast and analysis conclude the wholesale 
price reduction could be either marginal due to increased export, or substantial as 
several additional sources are being developed in the medium to long run. Nevertheless, 
due to insufficient transmission grids and cables, increased RES-E in Norway and 
Sweden will lead to lower power prices. The decrease in spot prices affects the 
consumer prices. Even with the additional certificate cost on top of the consumers’ 
electricity usage cost, consumer prices are likely to decrease. The fall in the system 
price is expected to be larger than the additional end-user certificate cost.  
The security of supply increases when further electricity sources are being developed. 
Norway would then be less dependent on imported energy and instead increase its 
export share. However, the increased electricity capacity is not large enough to function 
as a “green battery” for Europe. The European market is too large and insufficiency in 
transmission cables cause further obstacles for exporting Norwegian electricity to the 
European continent. Due to capacity problems in the current power grid, further 
development of new connections is likely to be given lower priority.  
Volatility of the certificate prices can be reduced with certificate banking. When 
certificates can be saved for later periods, the certificate price range decreases relative 
to the base scenario. Certificate banking is thus an efficient measure to avoid 
“maximum to minimum” volatility in certificate prices within short time.  
There is assumed that the implementation of a green certificate market would not lead 
to significant CO2-emission reductions in Norway in the short run. Most of the new 
renewable energy would be exported in the short run, however grid capacities are 
expected to be insufficient as RES-E increases with increasing quota. In the medium to 
long run on the other hand, there might be a reduction in Norwegian emissions as the 
new renewable energy might replace some of the consumption of fossil fuels. The 
short-term effect on European emissions would be marginal, as the European emissions 
are capped. Thus, a reduction in Norwegian emissions would only lead to increased 
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emissions from industries in other countries. In the long run on the other hand, the cap 
will be tightened since reduction in emissions in some countries would give policy 
makers incentives to tighten the future cap. All emission reductions are marginal, and 
since all EU and EEA member countries are obliged by the RES-E Directive, several 
small emission reductions in each country could be significant in a larger scale.  
The study has illustrated that the joint Swedish/Norwegian green certificate market is a 
cost-efficient policy scheme when the RES-E Directive is implemented. The more 
participating countries, the more cost-efficient the measure would be due to different 
marginal cost curves for increasing RES-E in different countries. When the scheme 
includes several countries, the RES-E could be done where it would be cheapest and 
countries with expensive RES-E would have the opportunity to buy certificates from 
other countries instead of producing RES-E on their own. Cost-efficiency would then 
be gained.   
R&D will not increase significantly in Norway with the regulation of the green market, 
despite increased RES investments. Increased activity in the Norwegian petroleum 
sector the upcoming years would cause a lack of engineers in Norway. R&D in the 
renewable energy sector would then come to halt if not imported labour could make up 
for some of the engineer shortage.  
Predictability of investment subsidies would increase when the responsibility of 
subsidising RES investments is being transferred from the government to the 
consumers. When the consumers are subsidising green producers directly, political 
governance does not influence the assigning funds and thus predictability increases. 
Since the joint green certificate market only include Norway and Sweden, conflicts of 
interests and market outcomes could affect the structure or the lifetime of the market 
and thus decrease predictability of investment subsidies.  
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Appendix A 
A model of the Norwegian energy system 
 
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 2011 
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Appendix B 
National Targets for EU member countries of shares of energy from renewable 
sources in 2020 
 
Source: European Commission, 2009
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Appendix C 
Installed wind power capacity in Europe divided by country (2009 and 2010) 
 
Source: Vindkraft.no, 2011 
 
 
 
 
